Iconic vs. short-term memory metacognition to evaluate the richness of perception
Two opposite views on the nature of our visual experience currently coexist. Visual experience is either rich and detailed, as our introspection often suggests, or this introspective feeling is an illusory phenomenon, and we can only consciously process a small portion of the visual input. In the latter scenario, one mechanism of the illusion effect has been coined “inflation”: people believe their perception is rich, even if it is not. Using a high-powered within-subjects approach, we propose to experimentally provide evidence for either view by comparing the levels of metacognitive sensitivity regarding iconic and working memory representations on a letter identification task. Our rationale is that, given that working memory metacognition is a benchmark of conscious processing, similar levels of metacognitive sensitivity between iconic and working memory conditions would suggest that information at the sensory level is consciously represented to the same extent as working memory information. Moreover, if inflation is at play, higher confidence levels should be found in the iconic memory condition.
This project is carried out within the framework of a grant from the Center for Open Science (COS) and the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) funded by the Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF).